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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates, from an Allyn Youngian perspective, the neoclassical Solow 
model of growth and the associated empirical estimates of the sources of growth 
based on it. It attempts to clarify Young’s particular concept of generalised or 
macroeconomic “increasing returns” to show the limitations of a model of growth 
based on an assumption that the aggregate production function is characterised by 
constant returns to scale but “augmented” by exogenous technical progress. Young’s 
concept of endogenous, self-sustaining growth is also shown to differ in important 
respects (including in its policy implications) from modern endogenous growth 
theory. 
 
Keywords: Solow model; aggregate production function; Allyn Young; endogenous 
growth theory; macroeconomic increasing returns. 
 
JEL Classifications: B22, B31, O30, O40, O47 
 3
There is no problem where there has been more loose thinking than in 
this of increasing returns… Large production, not large scale 
production, permits increasing returns (Allyn Young 1990:54).  
 
Robert Solow’s two seminal papers (1956, 1957) induced a burgeoning literature on 
“endogenous” growth theory. His theoretical and empirical work was based on a 
constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical aggregate production function that harked back 
to Charles Cobb and Paul Douglas (1928) who tested J B Clark’s marginal 
productivity theory of distribution. Solow’s model is expounded in companion papers, 
so here it is necessary only to remind that his work was a reaction against the “knife-
edge” instability of the Harrod-Domar model by invoking a general linear 
homogeneous production function with flexible factor prices and factor proportions to 
maintain full employment. The theory predicted a tendency to a steady state of zero 
growth in per worker terms unless the production function is augmented by technical 
progress. “Labour-augmenting” innovations could maintain the output-capital ratio 
and constant factor shares. In his empirical 1957 paper he found that the Cobb-
Douglas functional form fitted aggregate United States data (on growth of output per 
worker regressed against capital per worker) as well or better than any of the other 
forms with which he experimented. 
The Cobb-Douglas paper appeared in the same year as Allyn Young’s (1928) 
on increasing returns. Earlier, Young had also elaborated the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution in some detail as a co-author of the second (1908) edition of 
Richard T Ely’s Outlines of Economics. However, he had always been careful to 
differentiate static equilibrium theory and the individual profit-maximizing 
entrepreneur from the dynamics of the aggregate growth process through which are 
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set the product and factor prices to which the entrepreneur adjusts.1 Marginal 
productivity theory helps explain income distribution but not the determinants of 
marginal utility and productivity. The latter depend on conditions that affect demand 
and supply elasticities of products – hence of the factors – as incomes increase 
through time.2 
It is thus unlikely that Young would have embraced the Cobb-Douglas-Solow 
production function with its unidirectional dependence of aggregate output on factor 
inputs and technology. In Young’s theory of the circular flow, his concept of 
“increasing returns” is macroeconomic, arising from growth itself and hence 
dependent as much on demand as on supply, though Young emphasised that in the 
overall sense demand is the reciprocal of supply. Combined with the varying 
elasticities of supply of land, labour and capital goods, factor prices and market 
opportunities are determined and entrepreneurs adjust accordingly. In the process, the 
Marshallian “representative firm” – and industries too – tend constantly to lose their 
identity and become increasingly specialised, employing increasingly specialised 
methods, hence becoming increasingly productive. This interplay questions how far 
output growth can be explained in Solovian fashion by the measured growth of capital 
and labour inputs weighted by their income shares if incomes mainly reflect relative 
scarcities which in turn depend on growth of GDP.3 
                                                 
1 J B Clark (1899: vi) himself wrote that his theory “tries completely to isolate the static 
forces that act in distribution from the dynamic forces.” 
2 In 1908 Young discussed the relation between the “annual product”  (inclusive of capital 
goods) and the “social dividend” (sale of final goods and services), showing “the importance 
of the greater productivity of indirect, time using methods of production for the theory of 
interest” (in Mehrling and Sandilands, 1999:73). This was an early exposition of what 
Young’s student Frank Knight would later call the “wheel of wealth” or the circular flow of 
income mediated through time by the rate of interest. Young stressed the relation between 
product and factor demand, showing that rewards “imputed” to factors are not the same as 
their contributions.      
3 In Ely et al (1908:324-35), Young criticises Clark for fudging this circularity problem in 
respect of capital. 
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 It is clear from his chapters on value theory in the various editions of 
Outlines, in lectures at the London School of Economics 1927-29 as recorded by 
Nicholas Kaldor (Young 1990), and in correspondence with Frank Knight throughout 
the 1920s, that there were distinct limitations to the Marshallian concept of normal 
price for understanding secular growth. As detailed in Sandilands (2000), Young 
spoke of the “togetherness” of economic phenomena so that the conventional 
Marshallian apparatus of supply and demand and Clark’s marginal productivity theory 
could not be integrated to give the social picture or explain why growth tends to be 
self-sustaining rather than self-exhausting (as in Solow’s model). 
Also showing the development of his thinking is Young’s (1913) critique of 
A. C. Pigou on social cost. Pigou had insisted that if expansion of a competitive 
industry with “decreasing returns“ (rising supply curve) drives up factor prices for 
other industries, then this “external diseconomy” raises the social above the private 
cost, thus justifying a tax. Vice versa for competitive “increasing returns” industries if 
lower factor prices due to a larger industry are not offset by the rising expenses of 
each firm as it expands. Young criticised Pigou for confusing transfer payments as 
real costs, and for failing to distinguish the independent effects of a larger firm size 
from those connected with an enlarged industry. He concluded that he could scarcely 
imagine a case where increasing returns, in Pigou’s sense, could coexist with 
competition. Furthermore, it would be practically impossible to identify increasing 
and decreasing returns industries and then to internalise these misconceived Pigouvian 
externalities with taxes or subsidies.  
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But Young did not deny the significance of Marshallian external economies, 
as is clear from his 1928 presidential address.4 However, his untimely death (March 
1929) prevented him from developing the growth theory expounded there; and with 
the onset of the Great Depression interest in long-run growth waned in favour of 
depression economics until Roy Harrod and Evsey Domar renewed interest but along 
different lines from Young’s. Meantime, the cost controversy associated with others’ 
interpretations of Pigou and the Marshallian representative firm was oriented toward 
the nature of the firm itself rather than the way the representative firm might evolve in 
the overall growth process. Young (1928:527) himself warned that he did not propose 
to discuss those “alluring” but narrower questions, and that the supply and demand 
apparatus being developed for that purpose “may stand in the way of a clear view of 
the more general or elementary aspects of the phenomena of increasing returns”. Soon 
the imperfect and monopolistic competition theories of the firm in equilibrium would 
also distract attention from Young’s disequilibrium view of monopolistic competition.  
Instead, Solow (1956 and 1957) came to dominate growth theory and related 
empirical work, following his finding that nearly 90 percent of the growth of labour 
productivity could not be explained by growth of capital per worker. The “residual” 
was an unexplained measure of labour-augmenting technical progress. The two main 
strands to subsequent work were, first, redefinition and measurement of factors with a 
distinction between skilled and unskilled labour and inclusion of human with physical 
capital; and second, special attention to the nature of “knowledge” and research and 
development expenditures. Most of this research has retained the neoclassical growth 
framework, but with the new variables placed comfortably within it. Thus instead of 
                                                 
4 Peter Newman (1987) misinterpreted Young’s criticism of Pigou, suggesting that he later 
regretted his claim that cases of increasing returns in competitive industries must be rare. But 
there is no inconsistency. Young rejected Pigou’s notion of external economies, but (subject 
to caveats) not Marshall’s.  
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growth of aggregate output being driven only by inputs of capital and labour, it is also 
driven more explicitly by effective labour, with human capital increased through the 
knowledge that comes from education, training and learning by doing.  
 
A Youngian evaluation of attempts to endogenize Solow’s “residual”  
The distinctive feature of knowledge in the wealth of nations (to echo the title of 
David Warsh’s [2006] enthusiastic “story of economic discovery” of modern 
endogenous growth theory, with Paul Romer heading a star cast) is that it is “non-
rivalrous” and only partially and temporarily excludable by learning costs and patent 
protection. In the medium and long run, pure and applied scientific advances are 
widely learned and copied. These features are modelled to allow resources devoted to 
R&D – now seen as an explicit explanatory driver of growth – to depend on expected 
internal net benefits, but also emphasising the external benefits of new knowledge.5 It 
is believed this explains why capital deepening is not subject to diminishing returns, 
thus converting the production function into one exhibiting increasing returns 
consistent with Young’s seminal, but rather “mushy” (as characterised by Krugman 
1993) non-mathematical treatment of the subject.6  
                                                 
5 Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1998:79) call imitators’ dissipation of innovators’ profits 
a “Schumpeterian business-stealing effect” that discourages innovation and lends support for 
monopoly and protectionism. By contrast, Young stressed the positive role of competition to 
maximise the pecuniary external economies inherent in the free market mechanism (see 
Chandra and Sandilands 2006, and parallel ideas in Baumol 2002).   
6 Warsh (2006:91) also deprecates Young as a rather fuzzy “literary” economist who (unlike 
Frank Ramsay on savings and optimal growth) “eschewed mathematics altogether”. Yet 
Irving Fisher acclaimed him “decidedly the best mathematician among living American 
economists” (see Earl Hamilton in Sandilands 1999:469). Observe too the math in the 
appendix to Young (1928:540-42), mentioned in Young’s letter to Frank Knight, 11 August 
1928, showing it was prepared in advance of his September presidential address. Commenting 
on the Knight’s theory of price, he wrote: “Where I don’t follow you, of course, is in respect 
of increasing returns... The economies which show themselves in increasing returns are the 
economies of large production, not of large-scale production. I have just sent a mathematical 
note on this matter to the printer.”  
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But does this modern theory really coincide with Young’s emphasis on the 
size of the overall market in his treatment of knowledge, induced innovation, 
externalities and the factor rewards? A major difference is that neoclassical theories 
are based on a mainly input-driven, supply-side view of the growth process. New 
kinds of inputs may be introduced but in their production functions causation runs 
unidirectionally from inputs to outputs. This is true even of Marvin Frankel’s (1962) 
model, based on Solow but with a “development modifier” that makes enterprise 
production functions depend on the aggregate capital stock per worker. Aghion and 
Howitt (1998) see this as an early but neglected endogenous growth model in tune 
with Romer (1986) where social returns on capital (the vehicle for accumulation of 
knowledge, especially when including human capital) so exceed private returns as to 
yield an AK production function (see also Sandilands 2000). But Frankel still retains a 
Solovian framework in which growth is driven by capital without explaining what 
drives capital.   
This is less true of Kenneth Arrow’s (1962) model where learning-by-doing 
depends on the cumulative production experience. However, Alberto Ades and 
Edward Glaeser (1999) test whether learning-by-doing is as important as Young’s 
stress on growth of market size. They find that insofar as scope for learning-by-doing 
is greater in advanced products in which rich countries specialise, it is less important 
than growth of markets in explaining why poor countries have most to gain from trade 
liberalisation for they, with their narrower range of products, are more specialised. 
But the significance of specialisation for Young is not so much potential economies of 
scale from a small number of products, but rather the economies from a larger number 
of specialised firms producing and using a larger number of specialised products. 
Actually the range of firms and products expanded most in poorer countries such as 
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China and India that grew most rapidly after opening up trade. This is in line with 
Yongsheng Zhang and Xueyan Zhao (2004) – following the extensive work of 
Xiaokai Yang (2003) on Youngian economics – that showed a declining average size 
of firm as growth proceeded in countries such as Mexico and South Korea.7 
Young saw the supply and effectiveness of inputs as driven by aggregate 
derived demand or the force of overall market demand for goods and services whose 
size is in turn affected by the degree of competition and mobility in product and factor 
markets. However, when Young emphasises demand it is in the special sense of real 
aggregate reciprocal demand (abstracting from fluctuations arising from monetary 
disturbances8). Thus  
the capacity to buy depends upon capacity to produce. In an inclusive view, 
considering the market not as an outlet for the products of a particular industry, 
and therefore external to that industry, but as the outlet for goods in general, the 
size of the market is determined and defined by the volume of production” 
(1928:533).  
 
Consequently the Marshallian apparatus of sectoral supply and demand curves 
cannot adequately illumine the growth process. Young acknowledged Marshall’s 
“fruitful distinction between the internal productive economies which a particular firm 
is able to secure as the growth of the market permits it to enlarge the scale of its 
operations and the economies external to the individual firm which show themselves 
only in changes of the organization of the industry as a whole” (527), but he thought 
                                                 
7  Marshall (1920:318) believed an increase in the size of the industry will generally increase 
the size of the representative firm, and wrote: “The law of increasing returns may be worded 
thus: An increase of labour and capital leads generally to improved organization which 
increases the efficiency of the work of labour and capital.” Young might complain that this is 
a supply-side “law” that misses the crucial role of demand, and that increased specialisation 
often means smaller firms.  
8 Some necessary qualifications, allowing for monetary disturbances and malinvestments, are 
found in Young (1928a:145) to indicate that despite a powerful underlying, self-reinforcing 
secular trend, there may be cyclical interruptions: “There is a sense in which supply and 
demand, seen in the aggregate, are merely different aspects of a single situation. It is for this 
reason that some of the older economists held that general overproduction is impossible – a 
theorem which, though not really erroneous, has proved to be misleading.” Young’s cycle 
theory is similar to Ralph Hawtrey’s monetary theory: see Laidler 1993.  
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Marshall underplayed the qualitative changes in the external field. The internal 
economies of the representative firm “dissolve into the internal and external 
economies of the more highly specialized undertakings which are its successors, and 
are supplemented by new economies.” Further: 
Insofar as it is an adjustment to a new situation created by the growth of the 
market for the final products of industry the division of labour among industries 
is a vehicle of increasing returns. It is more than a change of form incidental to 
the full securing of the advantages of capitalistic methods of production – 
although it is largely that – for it has some advantages of its own which are 
independent of changes in productive technique (538). 
 
Young thereby extended Smith’s famous aphorism that the division of labour 
is limited by the size of the market – in turn limited by the degree of competition. 
Today, “we mean by the division of labour something much broader in scope than 
that splitting up of occupations and development of specialized crafts which Adam 
Smith mostly had in mind” (Young 1928:529). Instead it shows up as increasingly 
specialized firms and industries, using more roundabout methods and producing 
increasingly differentiated consumer and capital goods. Emphasis is on economics of 
specialisation rather than economies of scale. Thus  
the principal economies which manifest themselves in increasing returns… are 
largely identical with the economies of the division of labour in its most important 
modern forms. In fact, these economies lie under our eyes, but we may miss them 
if we try to make of large-scale production (in the sense of production by large 
firms or large industries), as contrasted with large production, any more than an 
incident in the general process by which increasing returns are secured (ibid.:531). 
 
 Here, importantly, “large production” means not only large real (reciprocal) 
demand or size of market for an industry in which the single firm operates, but also 
the size of the whole economy in which the single industry operates, and indeed of the 
size of the effective world economy to which a country has access. With a larger 
market in Young’s inclusive sense of “an aggregate of productive activities, tied 
together by trade” (1928:533, emphasis added), an “increasingly intricate nexus of 
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specialized undertakings has inserted itself between the producer of raw materials and 
the consumer of the final product” (ibid.:538). Both the scale and nature of firms and 
industries in a growing economy are determined not only, and not mainly, by their 
own sales but rather by sales of the industry or economy to which they are ancillary. 
 In a “Marshall-Young-Romer” model, Romer (1989) attempts to formalize the 
significance of this “increasingly intricate nexus of undertakings”. He posits that the 
greater the number of intermediate inputs the greater the productivity of given 
resources. Here the constraint on specialization is the fixed cost (giving rise to a U-
shaped average cost curve) of each addition to the list of intermediate inputs produced 
by specialist firms. If each specialist is a monopolist, it faces downward-sloping 
demand and excess profits that entice additional specialist firms. This reduces demand 
for each of the specialists (all assumed to have similar costs) until equilibrium is 
established with excess profits eliminated and price equal to average cost above the 
minimum on the U-shaped curve. This, then, is a model incorporating Chamberlinian 
monopolistic competition, so Euler’s theorem cannot apply: conventional factor 
inputs receive less than their marginal products and the excess compensates producers 
for the fixed costs of specialist goods that generate increasing returns. The larger the 
resources devoted to specialization (constrained by the discounted present value of 
expected benefits), the greater these returns.    
 Monopolistic competition is a feature common to many endogenous growth 
models (and of new trade theory too: for example, Krugman 1990), but according to 
Earl Hamilton (in Sandilands 1999:469) “every worthwhile idea in E.H. Chamberlin’s 
subsequent work on imperfect competition had been clearly expounded by Allyn 
Young in class long before Chamberlin put pen to paper.” However, Young’s LSE 
lectures (Young 1990) indicate that the number of specialist firms (whether producing 
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intermediate inputs or more varied consumer goods) is ultimately constrained by the 
growth of the market which determines how many resources it is worth devoting to 
this. In elaborating his theory of increasing returns, he stressed that “all costs are 
prime [i.e., variable] costs if you take the right period of time” (ibid.:49), and 
“underproduction is a feature of a state of growth. Plant cannot grow by 
infinitesimals; the [ever-changing] representative firm generally has more power than 
is necessary for immediate needs. It shows progress rather than depression and is 
evidently, in the long run, productive and economical or it would not be done” (48). 
Thus “surplus productive capacity is a normal and necessary condition of economic 
progress” (54), and increasing returns are consistent with intense competition. 
Monopolistic competition is inherent in Young’s view of competition as a process in 
growth, intrinsically tied to qualitative changes to the increasingly specialized 
representative firm.  
 In Romer (1994) the focus moves away from specialization as the source of 
growth and instead stresses the nonrivalrous nature of knowledge “goods”. He asserts: 
“If there are no nonrival goods, there are no increasing returns” (15). In Young, 
however, what is important is not knowledge as such but knowledge in use. Here he 
again differs from Romer in his emphasis on the importance of market size – and its 
growth – in making it economic to adapt and use existing as well as new knowledge 
that hitherto was known but uneconomic. It is not ignorance that prevents less 
developed countries from using tractors instead of oxen. But even developed countries 
forego the latest technology until it pays. New inputs, both of the conventional and 
unconventional (ideas) kind, become as much the result as the cause of economic 
growth. Thus the powerful concluding lines of Young’s (1928) presidential address: 
The division of labour depends upon the extent of the market, but the extent of the 
market also depends upon the division of labour. In this circumstance lies the 
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possibility of economic progress, apart from the progress which comes as a result 
of the new knowledge which men are able to gain, whether in the pursuit of their 
economic or of their noneconomic interests (539-40; italics added). 
 
Although in explaining this cumulative process Young (1928) wrote that 
Marshallian curve analysis “may divert attention to incidental or partial aspects of a 
process that ought to be seen as a whole” (533), nevertheless one might learn 
something from it if one enquires 
into the operations of reciprocal demand when the commodities are produced 
competitively under conditions of increasing returns and when the demand for 
each product is elastic, in the special sense that a small increase in its supply will 
be attended by an increase in the amounts of other commodities which can be had 
in exchange for it. Under such conditions an increase in the supply of one 
commodity is an increase in the demand for other commodities, and it must be 
supposed that every increase in demand will evoke an increase in supply. The rate 
at which any one industry grows is conditioned by the rate at which other 
industries grow, but since the elasticities of demand and of supply will differ for 
different products, some industries will grow faster than others. Even with a 
stationary population and in the absence of new discoveries in pure or applied 
science there are no limits to the process of expansion except the limits beyond 
which demand is not elastic and returns do not increase (ibid.:534).  
 
 However, even in the reciprocal relationship between an inelastic-demand 
sector such as agriculture and the rest of the economy, producers of such commodities 
“often share in the advantages of the increase of the general scale of production in 
related industries, and so far as they do productive resources are released for other 
uses” (ibid.:535). Thus agricultural costs may fall partly through innovations 
(including, but not only, through “general purpose technologies” such as computers) 
in fields such as steel, engines and petrochemicals that only partly relate to the size of 
agriculture (just as the cost of steel etc is reduced, directly or indirectly, by a fall in 
agricultural costs). And so long as wants are insatiable, the overall income elasticity 
of demand for all goods is unity (again abstracting from exogenous interruptions to 
secular growth). 
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If Youngian “macroeconomic” (Lauchlin Currie 1997) or “generalized” 
(James Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon 1999; Buchanan 2008) increasing returns, 
associated with a growing “aggregate of productive activities tied together by trade”, 
arise from this increasingly complex nexus of specialized undertakings, the benefits 
involve increased transactions costs. Xiaokai Yang and Jeff Borland (1991), and Yang 
(2003) emphasize that with Youngian fragmentation of production, a new role 
emerges for co-ordination services such as transport and communications as well as 
research and advertising. However, Young (1928) himself wrote:       
One who likes to conceive of all economic processes in terms of tendencies 
towards an equilibrium might even maintain that increasing returns, so far as they 
depend upon the economies of indirect methods of production and the size of the 
market, are offset and negated by their costs… This would amount to saying that 
no real economic progress could come through the operation of forces engendered 
within the economic system – a conclusion repugnant to common sense... The 
appropriate conception is that of a moving equilibrium, and… the costs which 
(under increasing returns) grow less rapidly than the product are not the “costs” 
which figure in an “equilibrium of costs and advantages” (535). 
 
These increasing returns are also reaped by service sectors as the market 
grows. For example, all sectors require transport but how far each sector enjoys a 
reduction in these costs depends, paradoxically, on others’ increased use of it. Thus 
are costs associated with the securing of increasing returns differentiated from those 
involved in a conventional “equilibrium of costs and advantages”. With increasing 
returns there is no equilibrium except a moving equilibrium of technical and 
organizational change that is cumulative, self-sustaining and endogenous to the size of 
the overall real market – a demand-driven rather than an input-driven theory of 
growth.9  
                                                 
9 See Nicholas Kaldor (1972) and Young’s (1990:45) statement (cited by Kaldor) that 
“seeking for equilibrium under increasing returns is as good as looking for a mare’s nest.” 
Young had a profound influence on Kaldor (see Thirlwall 1987) and may have inspired 
Kaldor’s “technical progress function” in which the growth of labour productivity is a 
positive function of the growth of capital per worker that embodies technical progress ( &q  = a 
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However, the rate is subject to various obstacles, natural (such as inelastic 
demand for a major sector like agriculture) or man-made, and these may be relaxed or 
exacerbated by exogenous events or policies. The latter would include not only better 
monetary management, but also attacks on institutional obstacles to competition and 
mobility (notably those inhibiting movement out of sectors such as agriculture that 
face low demand elasticity but substantial increases in labour productivity).10   
Regarding Marshall’s statement that an industry’s long-run supply schedule 
may fall “given time for the organisation of industry”, Young (1990:47-8) wrote:  
But that is exactly the problem: how much time?... The ‘period of time’ is relative 
to costs, and the costs are relative to the period of time… A long-period supply 
curve is meaningless apart from the particular length of time considered: the curve 
is relative to the rate at which increasing returns exist. On the other side you 
cannot postulate a constant demand curve for a good over a long period. It would 
shift as a result of the very forces which are shifting the supply curve. We need a 
theory of an equilibrium rate of progress. Probably the optimum rate of progress 
which will keep the supply curve close up to the demand curve.11 
 
These reciprocal curves depend on their interrelated elasticities, which helps 
clarify an otherwise elusive statement in Young (1928:534n.):  
                                                                                                                                            
+ b &k ). With 0 < b' < 1, the two growth rates converge toward a sustainable equilibrium rate 
of productivity growth. In addition, the constant term may shift up over time due to 
exogenous technical change or learning-by-doing – as with Erik Lundberg’s “Horndal effect” 
mentioned by Mauro Boianovsky (2008). But Kaldor thought that increasing returns are 
confined to manufacturing and debated this with Currie (in Sandilands 1990:296-303). 
Youngian specialisation also enhances productivity via  “disembodied” organisational 
changes requiring little extra capital.  
   Another Swedish connection to Young is told by Bertil Ohlin in Sandilands (1999:473). 
Ohlin relates that Young “impressed me immensely [at Harvard in 1922-23]… He knew and 
understood his subject better than anyone else I have met. I tested him by means of a question 
about the “Wicksell effect”, i.e., the special aspects of the marginal productivity of capital 
which at that time was practically unknown in most countries outside of Scandinavia. He 
immediately gave a fine account in a five minute speech before the students.”  
10 Stressed by Currie (1981, 1997) in his “leading-sector” theory of development (cf. Ramesh 
Chandra 2006). Institutional reform in urban housing finance and the exchange-rate regime 
could liberate latent demand (in Young’s reciprocal sense) for sectors whose expansion had 
hitherto been artificially repressed (thus repressing the rest of the economy too). 
11 At the conference Professor Solow asked if increasing returns exhibit diminishing returns in 
moving, for example, from aircraft to airframes to engines to rotor blades produced by 
increasingly specialised firms. The above paragraphs show it depends on the time frame, the 
secular direction of the structure of demand, and the degree of competition and mobility.  
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If the circumstance that commodity a is produced under conditions of increasing 
returns is taken into account as a factor in the elasticity of demand for b in terms 
of a, elasticity of demand and elasticity of supply may be looked upon as different 
ways of expressing a single functional relation.  
 
 However, consider an inelastic-demand sector such as agriculture. For the 
long period, its downwardly shifting short-period cost schedules will appear as a 
downward-sloping supply schedule that nearly coincides with its demand schedule. 
Even if its cost reductions (increasing returns) are similar to those in other industries, 
both its long-period demand and supply schedules will be more steeply sloped (less 
elastic) than for products with elastic demand. For the supply schedules, this may 
seem paradoxical. But long-run industry supply is derived from a series of shifting 
cost schedules for the firms (farms) in a competitive industry while demand 
conditions will dictate how many firms remain in the industry. With inelastic demand 
that number will fall – and will fall faster the greater the exodus of labor from 
agriculture into sectors with higher elasticity of demand.. 
 
Factor shares and the labour-saving bias of technical progress 
Another outgrowth of Solovian growth theory concerned the factor bias to the 
technical progress than accompanies growth. Samuelson (1965, 1966), highlighted by 
Stiglitz (2006:237), addressed the issue whether a rise in the wage rate (which occurs 
in both the Young and Solow theories as productivity advances) is likely to induce a 
labour-saving bias to innovation, following William Fellner (1961) and Charles 
Kennedy (1964).12 
                                                 
12 Samuelson (1966) was a rejoinder to Kennedy on “induced Harrod-neutral technical 
change” that keeps relative factor shares constant. If the capital-labour ratio rises, labour-
saving innovation prevents capital’s share from falling, thus also maintaining a relatively 
constant return on capital – one of Kaldor’s famous “stylized facts”. Kaldor’s LSE lecture 
notes reveal that Young (1990:99), following Cassel, also stressed this. Solow (1994:49) 
notes that the assumption of constant returns to capital makes increasing returns to scale 
“inevitable”, along with the modeling of monopolistic competition. But Young’s increasingly 
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Samuelson and Stiglitz deny any a priori reason for such a bias, for a higher 
wage rate need not increase unit wage costs when capital deepening raises 
productivity, so there is no incentive to bias marginal R&D expenditures in the 
labour-saving direction. But if technical progress were Hicks-neutral (with neither a 
labour-saving nor capital-saving bias) capital deepening would raise capital’s share 
progressively. In view of the historically observed labour-saving bias, Samuelson 
suggests a natural tendency for innovative effort simply to follow the (successful) 
labour-saving trend. And the actual labour-saving bias explains the relative constancy 
of labour’s share despite capital deepening and rising wage rates.  
An alternative explanation could be asymmetry in the response to a rise in the 
economy’s “going wage” by relatively labour-intensive industries compared with 
more capital-intensive ones. Labour-intensive sectors whose labour productivity is 
below average do face rising unit wage costs, and thus face greatest pressure to make 
labour-saving adjustments. Nevertheless, they are still likely to suffer a decline in 
their domestic and international comparative advantages (a kind of Balassa-
Samuelson effect upon their relative costs). The squeeze on these sectors releases 
resources for expansion of capital-intensive sectors where labour’s productivity is 
higher. Thus the economy’s measured average labour productivity will increase 
without there necessarily having been any further labour-saving innovations in the 
expanding sectors. All that has happened is that labour will have shifted to sectors 
with higher labour productivity.  
This is consistent with Young’s stress on the way an expanding market makes 
it pay to introduce the more roundabout or indirect uses of labour that most 
powerfully raise productivity and lower costs. If lower costs are passed on through 
                                                                                                                                            
specialized monopolistically competitive firms that are the vehicle of his “increasing returns” 
are not necessarily exploiting “returns to scale” from being larger than their predecessors.  
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competition in lower prices or higher money wages, market demand increases further. 
This provides, endogenously, the incentive and the resources to continue investing 
and innovating (whether in a predominantly labour-saving direction or not). So long 
as capital accumulation keeps the return on new investment more or less constant, it 
means that despite or because of growing labour scarcity (which implies growing 
labour productivity13) the purchasing power of wages can keep rising without 
depressing investment incentives. The wage rate (but not necessarily the wages share) 
will rise relative to the return on physical capital.  
These ratios (and absolute returns) are, to repeat, ultimately simply a matter of 
(derived) supply and demand. As Young (1990:25) put it: “The values of the factors 
merely reflect the value which consumers attach to final products of such factors.” 
Constantly on guard against the fallacy of composition, he also wrote: 
Fundamentally, there is no difference between productivity and scarcity. Scarcity 
is meaningless except in relation to human desires; so is productivity. This does 
not mean that you can create a product by creating scarcity… 
   An objection has been raised that it is “value”, not “product” that counts. But 
one does not produce value; the market values what one produces… Wages are 
paid for the value of what the workman produces. There must be some balancing 
of the factors of production. One should not fix one’s eye too narrowly on the way 
the individual entrepreneur apportions his expenses. One cannot apply an additive 
process and find a picture of the whole economy. The older economists thought on 
the grand scale. Take this notion of the universality of diminishing returns, of 
diminishing productivity. The individual entrepreneur is relatively disadvantaged 
if he oversupplies himself with one factor. Following Von Thünen, modern 
economists, assuming land and machinery are given, draw decreasing productivity 
curves to labour. But what significance does this have? To what extent is this 
diminishing productivity a matter of the individual firm? Would integration give a 
good social picture? 
 
In other words, capital deepening and the shape and productivity of the 
isoquants associated with a move across an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production 
function, are being driven by both the past growth of output and the expected increase 
                                                 
13 In value terms, giving rise to increased output being imputed to labour in higher wages even 
though the cause of rising labour productivity/scarcity lies elsewhere; see below.  
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and pattern of demand that increasing incomes induce. This favours labour-intensive 
or capital-intensive goods and services according to differing elasticities of demand 
and relative product prices – in turn determined by relative elasticities of factor 
supplies in response to the demands.14  
 But many inherently labour-intensive services have high income elasticity of 
demand. Partly this is because of the nature of services like education and health.15 
Partly it is because Youngian increasing returns involve a thickening of the trade and 
exchange nexus (as stressed by Yang 2003) that requires labour-intensive services 
such as transport and communications, as well as training and research. Significantly, 
although their costs per unit also fall with labour-saving innovation, as a share of 
GDP they tend to rise because of their income-elastic demand. Thus the derived 
demand for labour may increase on account of demand-side forces even if there is an 
induced labour-saving innovation bias. The growth of services has been greatest in the 
more advanced countries where most of the world’s inventive activity occurs. This 
provides another Youngian demand-side explanation for relatively constant factor 
shares and return to investment. Single-product or “corn” models of growth (including 
Solow’s16) cannot explain this. 
                                                 
14 Young’s (1928:540-42) appendix explains the italicised problem of breaking free of a 
conventional equilibrium of costs and benefits to secure an equilibrium rate of potential 
increasing returns. He invokes a special isoquant and indifference map, with different 
(reciprocal) sectoral supply and demand elasticities. Then: “To diminish the amount of the 
one commodity which must be sacrificed for a given increment of the other, some of the 
labour hitherto devoted to its production must be used indirectly, so that the increase of the 
annual output of the one lags behind the curtailing of the output of the other.”    
15 But Japan has made great advances with robots (as well as computers) to replace humans in 
these fields. (On “machine slavery”, Young [in Mehrling and Sandilands (1999:243)]) wrote: 
“One way, perhaps the most important way, out of the admitted evils of the machine system is 
through the more thorough utilization of the possibilities of that system.”) 
16 However, cf. Solow (1958) on constancy of relative shares. He considers sectoral 
differences in the elasticity of substitution as factor price ratios change, but not the bias of 
technical progress or sectoral differences in demand elasticities. See also his conference 
speech in this volume.  
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Incidentally, a growth model that explicitly separates the fixed supply of 
classical Land (claiming classical Ricardian rents) from the elastic supply of capital 
(claiming interest), would argue for a bias toward land-saving innovations. Without 
these, the “free” gifts of Nature command higher transfer payments to whomsoever 
can claim property rights over them. Similarly, separating skilled and unskilled 
labour, a growing relative demand for skills may induce a bias in favour of skill-
saving innovation.  
Ultimately, to repeat, factor incomes are not so much the result of the value of 
their contributions to the growth of GDP. Rather they are what the market attributes 
or imputes to them through the forces of supply and demand. Thus, when searching 
for the sources of growth, Samuelson (1980:502) surely misleads policy when he 
writes, on the basis of the Solow model, that “a 1% increase in labour increases output 
by 3 times as much as a 1% increase in capital, if the exponent on L is 0.75.” 
This could induce misplaced complacency toward population growth and 
rapid immigration. It is macroeconomic supply and demand as well as physical 
productivity that determines factor payments and shares. Factors must have scarcity as 
well as productivity if firms are to pay them well. The market distributes the fruits of 
economic progress accordingly, in the form of pecuniary external benefits, with 
factors paid not for what they contribute but rather on how far competition and 
mobility reduce prices and induce factors to move to where they are most valued. 
Pecuniary externalities are thus inherent in a successful market system, not a sign of 
its failure. Failure comes from monopoly17 and protectionist elements, including 
excessively strong patents – which Young (1990:52) opposed. For, to repeat, it is not 
knowledge per se that matters but the freedom to apply knowledge as and when it 
                                                 
17 As distinct from monopolistic competition, insofar as this is central to increasing 
specialization and differentiation inherent in the phenomenon of increasing returns. 
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pays, which depends on the fastest possible growth of market size and specialisation – 
not upon the largest size of the firm or industry as stressed by neo-Schumpeterian and 
neoclassical endogenous growth theories. 
 
Conclusion 
  
Ultimately then (as Currie 1997 insisted) the main sources of growth are competition, 
mobility, and growth itself. But perhaps the contrast with recent neoclassical 
theorising may best be inferred from Young’s own conclusion to an essay entitled 
“The sources of wealth”:   
Science teaches how to harness nature, and to use her powers for our own needs. 
For a short time, the advance of scientific knowledge may be “capitalized” in the 
form of valuable technical secrets, or in patent rights, but, in the long run, 
scientific knowledge, of whatever sort, becomes diffused. We pay no rent, interest 
or royalty to science as such. We merely have to pay for the technical equipment, 
for the capital, which is required if we are to make effective use of our 
accumulated fund of scientific knowledge. Appraised by his real contributions to 
wealth and welfare, not in dollars and cents, the scientist may easily outrank the 
millionaire or the captain of industry. His contributions to society’s capital are, in 
general, free. For that reason, they do not fall under the ordinary laws of supply 
and demand. There is no limitation of supply; there is no question of a larger or a 
smaller number of increments of supply. The scientist’s contribution is, or 
becomes, a free good. Just because it is diffused and free, its apparent utility to 
society may be less. Ordinary capital, in order to have value, must have both 
utility (productivity) and scarcity. The scientist’s contribution has productivity 
without scarcity (Young 1929:237). 
 
In short, attributions (payments) to factors under increasing returns have only 
tenuous links with contributions to growth. Young’s vision was thus an extension of 
“one of the most illuminating and fruitful generalisations which can be found 
anywhere in the whole literature of economics” (1928: 529), namely Smith’s dictum 
that the division of labour is limited by the size (and, one must add, the freeness) of 
the market. While modern growth theory focuses on the microeconomic foundations 
of neoclassical growth theory by noting how entrepreneurs allocate resources to 
innovation according to a profit-maximizing balancing of private costs and benefits 
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that may also yield external benefits, Young’s more classical approach stresses the 
macro foundations of microeconomics. The dynamic creative function of markets 
induces productivity-enhancing specialization and roundabout methods that yield self-
sustaining macroeconomic increasing returns to which entrepreneurs respond in ways 
that defeat the otherwise self-exhausting accumulation process. Young’s approach 
converts the economics of scarcity and diminishing returns into the economics of 
opportunity and increasing returns.    
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